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Abstract: Contract farming is considered as institutional arrangements that manage the coordination
of production and distribution between smallholder farmers and agro-industrial firms. Under the
market reforms and industrialization process, contract farming links smallholder farmers to a better
market through effective farming management and high-quality products. Despite the many benefits
attributed to participation, the existing literature addresses the main issues that result in the opposing
attitudes and motivations toward contract farming. This study therefore aims to analyze factors that
influence the choices of smallholder farmers for different contract faming models using multinomial
logistic (MNL) regression. Different contract attributes and socio-economic characteristics of farmer
households are used as endogenous variables in the MNL model. Based on a research sample
of 183 smallholder farmers involved in certified coffee production in Dak Lak province, Vietnam,
the study revealed that there are different typologies of production contract including the informal
model, intermediary model, and nucleus estate model. Significant factors that affect smallholders’
preferences for different contract farming models are gender, farm size, the provision of inputs, price
option, technical assistance, delivery schedule, and monitoring. Main issues that induce failures of
contract farming are farmer’s overdependence and the monopolistic power of industrial coffee firms
in the nucleus estate model, as well as the information asymmetry in the informal model. In addition,
a cost-benefit analysis symbolizes the role of the cooperative in the intermediary model, which is
essential for augmenting win-win outcomes for smallholder farmers and industrial coffee firms.
Keywords: contract farming; smallholder; certified coffee production; multinomial logistic regression
1. Introduction
The transformation process of the global agriculture industry has introduced a higher level of
managed coordination which is increasingly shaping the modern structure of agriculture in the third
world [1–5]. In this context, contract farming has been considered as an important form of vertical
coordination in order to provide small-scale farmers in developing countries opportunities to be
part of the world market [3]. The existing literature has already highlighted the role of contract
farming in addressing market failures [3,6–8], coordinating agribusiness activities to produce high
quality products [3,9–13], improving farmer’s income [6,8,13,14], and enhancing rural development
by providing credit, inputs, information, services, and new cropping technologies [14–19]. However,
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there also has been much debate about the contractual arrangements by the agro-industrial firms that
often lack transparency and commitment and consequently cause a high default rate, cheating, delayed
payment, and crop failure [6]. Further, the farmers’ decisions to participate in contract farming are
due to a variety of reasons, such as an inefficient market system, pervasive production risks, capital
shortage, a lack of technical support, an input supply problem, product standardization, or simply the
purpose of earning additional income [8,13,20].
Vertical coordination in the agricultural sector refers to the process of synchronizing successive
stages of production, distribution, and marketing in order to manage economic relationships between
farmers and agro-industrial firms [21,22]. Several forms of vertical coordination range from open
production (spot market) to contract farming and vertical integration [21–24]. In the top hierarchy
of vertical coordination in agriculture, a single agro-industrial firm acquires two or more successive
stages within the same production vertical [21], which could be either backward or forward [25].
An agro-industrial firm vertically integrates because it secures the supplies needed to produce its
product and the market needed to sell the product. At the lowest level of vertical coordination, open
production notably leads to farm products more adapted to local markets where spot prices coordinate
resource transfer across the stages of farm production [21,26]. Slightly different from both, contract
farming involves more interaction between the agro-industrial firms and farmers in predetermining a
delivery schedule, pricing mechanism, and product standards [21,24]. In contract farming, farmers
and agro-industrial firms engage in intense relationships that include conflict, trust, commitment,
and the expectation of continuity [27,28]. In recent years, increasing farmer participation in the
export sector through contract farming has been attributed to the major role of processing and trading
firms (both private and state-owned) in providing production resources and guiding farmers to a
commitment of farming methods, delivery quantities, and product quality [7,8,13,22,29,30]. There is a
belief that this trend stems from the so-called industrialization process, globalization, and agricultural
market reforms, which demand greater vertical coordination [3,31]. In addition, concerns about food
safety and a higher demand for international standards have tended to adopt the coexistence of contract
farming and standardized agricultural production [22,32,33]. More generally, the incentives for contract
farming in developing countries have recently increased as a response to market imperfection and
transaction cost minimization [8,20,34,35]. Under the transaction cost economics (TCE) perspectives,
agricultural transactions involve high uncertainty and there are additional risks facing smallholder
farmers [8,20].
Key to understanding what contributes to the success and failure of contract farming are the motives
of farmers and agro-industrial firms to engage in such economic relationships. However, contract
farming models are diverse, not only with regard to the types of production, but also with respect to
how they can be structured and managed [36]. Eaton and Shepherd (2001) have illustrated five broad
contract farming models including the informal, intermediary, multipartite, centralized, and nucleus
estate [37,38]. Individual small firms involved in an ad-hoc or semi-formal production contract (often
on a seasonal basis) are characterized as the informal model [36,37]. The intermediary model consists
of semi-formal to formal subcontracting by agro-industrial firms to intermediaries (farmer groups,
buying agents, or cooperatives) who manage farmers’ production and provide services [36,37]. Under
the multipartite model, a variety of organizations, including statutory bodies, contract with farmers,
which may involve public or private providers of credit, extension services, and inputs [38]. In the
centralized model, an agro-industrial firm buys from a large number of farmers with pre-determined
product quality and supply quantity. Input provision varies from minimum to opposite extremes
where an agro-industrial firm takes control of most production stages [37]. The nucleus estate refers to
large farm unit that operates centralized production and processing, guarantees technical assistance
and a certain minimum provision of throughput via direct contracting with farmers (out-growers),
and implements close monitoring and supervision throughout the production [15,36,37]. Differences
in the technical requirements associated with production and transaction costs lead to the diversity of
contractual arrangements between farmers and agro-industrial firms [39].
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The Dak Lak coffee sector is an excellent case for examining the opportunities of certified coffee
farmers and agro-industrial firms to enhance vertical coordination through contract farming in Vietnam.
Vietnam remains one of the world’s most competitive coffee producers but the sustainable future
of the industry is being questioned due to various challenges [40,41]. First, production expansion
cannot continue due to environmental limitations. Second, global issues such as climate change and
deforestation directly affect coffee farmers through changes in local weather and water supplies [40,42].
Third, coffee replantation is urgent as more than 30% of the country’s coffee trees are diminishing in
coffee yield and quality [40]. Foremost, small-scale operations and the typical problems of limited
access to credit and technical assistance do not allow coffee farmers to benefit from economies of
scale, reduce production costs, raise productivity, and apply synchronous technologies. In this regard,
the Vietnamese government has launched a sustainable certified coffee program in which coordinating
production and distribution with main coffee processors/exporters is believed to bring better market
access, new product development (standardized and higher quality), and an improvement of farmers’
welfare. However, while new institutional arrangements have achieved successes, there remain many
issues regarding continuity in the program’s development.
Several authors have successfully explained the production efficiency [43] and ecological
sustainability [44–47] of the Dak Lak coffee sector, but the motivation of smallholder farmers and coffee
processors/exporters to engage in such a socioeconomic relationship of new product development [28]
have never been explored. For that reason, this study aims to analyze the factors that influence farmers’
preferences for different contract farming models under a sustainable certified coffee program by
a revealed choice model using multinomial logistic (MNL) regression. The nature of this study is
important from the transaction cost economics (TCE) perspective, in that contract farming could more
likely strengthen vertical coordination or hamper the efforts of certified coffee farmers to access to high
value markets. This study used a sample of 183 farmers who have participated in the sustainable
certified coffee program in Dak Lak province. Key informant interviews, document analysis, and field
observations were used to provide an overview of the coordination of production and distribution
within the program, as well as the general benefits and main issues of contract farming. A household
survey with semi-structured questionnaires was conducted to uncover key aspects of farmers’ particular
strategies to take part in vertical coordination through different contract farming models. The paper is
organized into four sections. The first section provides the research area, data source and sampling, data
analysis and empirical model specification. The next section outlines the main findings. A discussion,
conclusion, and the direction of future research are presented in the final section.
2. Review of Literature
2.1. Farmers’ Motivations towards Contract Farming Participation
Contract farming can be conceptualized as one of the governance structures in a vertical
coordination continuum that can be utilized to influence the requirements of a higher level of managed
coordination [3,48]. Governance structures such as networks, bureaucracy, cooperation, or markets are
institutional arrangements that have evolved to prevent or reduce transaction costs [35,49]. Therefore,
contract farming is explained as an institutional response to high transaction costs in agriculture
resulting from uncertainty, risk, an incomplete market, information asymmetry, and coordination
failures [3,6–8,50,51]. The farmers’ motivation to participate in contract farming is increasing across
various agricultural sectors in developing countries as part of so-called agro-industrialization [3,52].
Farmers choose to participate in contract farming for different reasons, and their motivations
and attitudes reflect the type of contracts and specific contract attributes [8,53,54]. However, it is also
possible to recognize two broad categories of farmers’ motivation to participate in contract farming,
namely performance assurance and risk management [52]. Thus, farmers are motivated to participate
in contract farming as they find the potential returns more attractive than returns from alternative
activities, or the level of risk to be acceptable [13,37]. More specifically, these attitudes emanate from the
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need for access to credit in order to obtain input availability, the need for access to market information,
opportunities to reduce factors of production, ability to enhance farm performance from access to
technical assistance, or market integration [15,20,55,56]. Indeed, risk-averse farmers will accept more
favorable contract terms in exchange for their certain returns [8]. However, previous studies also
proved that the relationships between farmers and agro-industrial firms in contract farming are rarely
governed by risk-sharing incentives [52]. That leads one strand in the literature to highlight how
contract farming is replete with manipulation and the exploitation of agro-industrial firms [6,13].
The other strands, as already mentioned, emphasize that the motivations to participate are related
to the positive impacts of contract farming on local economies by improving the welfare of rural
smallholders [7,8,31,38,57,58]. In general, motivations are attributed to the perceived benefits of
contract farming that alleviate the market uncertainties, enhance skills and knowledge acquisition,
increase cash income, and most importantly social esteem [13,52].
2.2. Empirical Studies on Preference of Contract Farming
Many authors have explored the field of preference or motivation for agricultural production
contracts where specific contract attributes are decisive factors for smallholder farmer in choosing
whether to sign a contract [49,53,54,59,60]. Most of the study approaches referred to the neoclassical
theory of farmers’ maximizing behavior [57], transaction cost economics [6–8,20,30,53,61], agency
theory [8,58], game theory [8], or combinations of these concepts [3,6,8]. Based on a stated preference or
revealed preference data, a discrete choice model (binary logistic, multinomial logistic, mixed logistic,
or conditional logistic) was developed for estimating farmers’ behavior. However, the multinomial
logistic model was widely used because it neither accommodates preference heterogeneity within choice
data nor allows each respondent to respond to multiple choice sets [62]. Other authors utilized cluster
analysis where factor analysis with PCA (principle component analysis) as the extraction method and
varimax rotation are used to group different variables that influence farmers’ preference toward different
contract attributes. Then the optimum numbers of clusters are identified based on similar farmers’
preferences. A few considered using latent class cluster analysis as a mixture likelihood approach
to clustering. Empirical studies have found several contract attributes that affect farmers’ choices
or motivation toward contract farming including inputs supply [8,49], technical assistance [8,30,49],
variable output [49], price options [30,49,54,61], delivery volume [54,59,63], contract duration [54,58,59],
access to credit [8], quality agreement [49,60,64], monitoring [8,60], and payment [60].
Abebe et al. (2013) [49] employed a multi-category discrete choice model (conditional and
alternative-specific conditional logistic) in the study of smallholders’ preferences for contract design
attributes. The study shows that smallholder farmers’ willingness to participate in the contract farming
of seed potatoes depends on several contract attributes such as the form of contract, inputs supply,
technical assistance, seed supply by the involved agro-industrial firms, variable output qualification,
and variable price options. In addition, the study results also indicated input market concern was more
important as smallholder farmers considered contract farming as a mechanism to reduce production
input uncertainty and fixed price option was not preferable in the output market. Beside, institutional
factors (rising food prices) and individual factors (entrepreneurial attitude of farmers) discouraged
farmers to participate in contract farming because it limits farmers’ autonomy in making decision.
Arouna et al. (2017) [60], used a stated choice model with mixed logistics in a study of contract farming
preferences by smallholder rice producers in Africa. The findings described that producers preferred
contract farming under several contract attributes including contract duration (short term), credit
provision, monitoring and supervision, payment at delivery, group selling, and having agro-processors
as a partner. Heterogeneity in preference indicated the different attitudes between male and female
producers towards contract farming participation. Schlecht and Spiller (2012) [59] applied a latent
class (LC) cluster analysis of farmers’ attitudes towards contract design in the dairy industry in
Germany. The study identified three different clusters indicating heterogeneity among dairy farmers’
attitudes towards contracting and long-term business relationships. Independent dairy farmers
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preferred short-term contracts. In addition, the authors suggested that higher base prices could be a
factor leading to the acceptance of a long-term contract as independent dairy farmers displayed the
highest price orientation. Furthermore, a long-term contract with committed contractual partners
could help dairy processors to secure a stable raw milk supply. The group uninvolved majority
represented the majority of farmers who were undecided on their preferences towards contract
attributes. In brief, due to the novelty of the topic of farmers’ motivation and attitude towards contract
design and participation, empirical studies often encounter the problem of endogeneity due to omitted
or unobservable variables.
3. Materials and Methods
3.1. Research Area
Dak Lak, a province of Vietnam, was chosen for this study. Dak Lak province is located in the
Central Highlands (Figure 1). The province’s geographic coordinates are from 107◦28′57” to 108◦59′37”
east longitude and from 12◦9′45” to 13◦25′06” north latitude with an average elevation from 400 to
800 m. The total land area of the province is 13,125.37 square kilometers. Due to its unique geographical
location with high altitude and favorable natural conditions with rich basaltic soil, Dak Lak has been
the capital of coffee production in Central Highland regions, accounted for more than 30 percent
of total coffee production in the whole country (Dak Lak Peoples’ Committee). Coffee production
provided employment for over 400,000 rural labors and greatly contributed to the economic and social
development of the region. Nowadays, hundreds of private (including the foreign-invested) and
state-owned exporter/processor are thriving in the coffee business, making the coffee bean market
highly competitive [41]. The city Buon Me Thuot is the center of all coffee trading activities.
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Despite its successes, the coffee sector has recently confronted many issues and problems. First,
climate change, i.e., a rising temperature, reduces the area of land suitable for coffee farming. Further,
the traditional farming habits of intensive use of fertilizer and excessive water irrigation diminish
soil fertility and induce water pollution [40,47,65]. Ground water reserves of the entire region are in
danger as massive cases of digging wells during the dry season [40,45,47]. In addition, deforestation
and a reduction of shade coffee are threatening biodiversity [42]. Besides, many farmers are now
facing typical problems of limited access to capital and technical assistance [40,66]. On the other hand,
economic transactions though spot markets often cause deficiencies in transferring production and
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market information in terms of coffee quality, timing, and future demand [67]. In response to these
challenges, a local government has been developing a model that encourages production-distribution
coordination between smallholder farmers and coffee industrial firms. However, the coffee production
areas designated in this coordination program account for less than 20% of total coffee production
in the province [68]. In this program, coffee farmers sign production contracts with several
exporters/processors and may or may not attain the full supports from these companies during
production and distribution. This program has initially brought significant impacts on farmer’ income
and temporarily considered as a solution to achieve the goal of adding value to farm products and
maintaining stable production of the sector. According to the local authorities, the coordination
through contract farming between the coffee exporters/processors and the household farmers not only
creates a stable source of high-quality certified coffee beans for export demand yet also contributes to
improved awareness, better farming practices, production efficiency, environment protection, and the
reciprocal relationship between coffee farmers and exporters/processors. Examples of such production
coordination is with the use of cooperatives, namely Ea Kiet (183.3 ha), Cu Dle Mnong (233.5 ha), Quang
Tien (105 ha), Minh Toan Loi (259.4 ha), and Tam Giang (166 ha). Here, horizontal and vertical linkages
are promoted through input subsidies, synchronous production management, technical exchange and
transfer, monitoring, production certification, and quality examination [68].
By the end of 2014, the total number of farmers involved in sustainable certified coffee production
through contract farming was 49,680, which covers an area of 67,808 hectares with total output of
222,711 tons. Accordingly, this accounts for 33.3% of the total coffee land area and 48.2% of total coffee
yield in Dak Lak. The most popular certification was 4C with 32,706 farmers and an area of 43,802 ha
resulted in the production of 141,447 tons. UTZ Certified accounted for 12,937 farmers and an area of
17,446 hectares with production of 55,840 tons. The total 3823 farmers followed RFA certification, which
accounts for an area of 6,143 hectares with production of 23,793 tons. At last, there was only small
number of 214 farmers who applied Fair Trade certification in an area of approximate 417 hectares with
production of 1631 tons. Except for the 4C and UTZ Certified existed early in Vietnam, other certified
coffee productions are quite in the pilot phase to expand [68].
3.2. Data Source and Sampling
The data for this study were collected from the Cu M’gar and Krong Pak districts of Dak Lak.
These districts are adjacent to the city center Buon Me Thuot of the province. Both primary and
secondary data source were used. First, the document analysis gathered reports and official statistics
from Dak Lak DARD, Cu M’gar DARD, Krong Pak DARD, WASI (Western Highlands Agro-Forestry
Scientific and Technical Institute), Buon Ma Thuot Coffee Association (BMTCA), and VICOFA (Vietnam
Coffee Cocoa Association). These documents are in regards to the details of coffee production and
coordination program between main exporters/processors and smallholder farmers. Second, key
informants was selected via a process of “theoretical sampling” [69] based on their potential to
offer distinct and important perspectives on coffee contract farming and recent issues regarding
farmers’ participation in coffee coordinating production through contract farming. The key informants
involved Dak Lak People Committee and DARD officials, Buon Ma Thuot Coffee Association (BMTCA)
members, exporters/processors involved in coordinating coffee production program, cooperative
directors, and heads of village. Third, the pre-test survey included exploratory direct interviews of
six key informants and 50 coffee farmers, which was implemented in April 2016. The purpose was
to justify the contents of the questionnaire and to assess the respondents’ understanding. Hence,
we analyzed responses and incorporated into the finalized questionnaire for household investigation
in 2017. Based on the classifications of Eaton and Shepherd [37], Bijman [38], and Minot [63] (Figure 3),
pre-test survey results elicited three different contract farming models for certified coffee farmers
in Dak Lak. Those are informal model (InforM), intermediary model (InterM), and nucleus estate
model (NeM). Out of 11 proposed contract attributes based on existing literature of [6,8,49,52,58–60],
the pre-test survey also confirmed nine common contract attributes in most contract farming models,
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including the duration of contract, provision of inputs, technical assistance, sale volume agreement,
price premium agreement, coffee bean qualification agreement, speed of payment, delivery procedure,
and supervision. Finally, the household investigation in 2017 covered 200 coffee farmers. However,
empirical analysis was based on 183 coffee farmers due to the response rate was 91.5%.
The semi-structured questionnaire was designed to uncover key aspects of farmers’ particular
preference regarding contract farming model that they selected (i.e., types of contract farming, contract
terms and conditions, the roles and functions of each contracting party, farm performance, and contract
execution). At the beginning, the respondents were asked to provide the general information of the
households’ socio-economic characteristics. The latter section focuses on different contract attributes
that reveal the farmers’ choices of their contract farming model. The revealed preference data have
the advantage of capturing actual choice decision [70]. The final section comprised several questions
on farmers’ perceptions toward general benefits, problems, and concerns related to contract farming
participation. We conducted the interviews at the farmers’ home, operational place or at the field.
The observation was supplementary to the interviews, described as “unobtrusive observation” [71].
In this study, a two-stage sampling method was used. The first stage involved a purposive
sampling of 200 sustainable certified coffee farmers from Krong Pak and Cu M’gar in Dak Lak where
coordinating coffee production through contract farming has recently been promoted. In this area,
coffee production is the main source of farmers’ income. The second stage was to identify groups of
farmers in different contract farming models. In the sample selection process, official experts in local
authorities, extension centers, and the Dak Lak Department of Agriculture and Rural Development
(DARD) were consulted. The major coffee exporters/processors, cooperative directors, heads of each
local village were also involved in the finalizing process of respondents list.
3.3. Data Analysis and Model Specification
Data analysis with SPSS version 22 was carried out in two steps. The descriptive data analysis
serves to identify basic socioeconomic characteristics of farmer household and farm performance (farm
size, coffee yield, gross margin, and rate of return from coffee production) under different contract
farming models. Farmers’ attitudes toward contracting and revealed preferences for specific contract
attributes were analyzed using cross tabulation and Chi-square test. Initial data analysis also includes
multivariate assessment. Specifically, a multicollinearity test was utilized using the variance inflation
factor (VIF) and the Eigen value. If the VIF is greater than 10, then there is a potential multicollinearity
problem [72]. No serious multicollinearity problems among variables in the sample were detected by
the VIF test as the variance inflation factors (VIF) ranged from 1.060 to 1.550. Accordingly, the tolerance
values ranged from 0.696 to 0.956 and Eigen values was 10.499 (Appendix A Table A1). In addition,
the Breusch-Pagan test was employed to detect the presence of heteroscedasticity and the test result
indicated no problem of heteroscedasticity (p-value = 0.611) (Appendix A Table A2). In order to identify
major factors that influence farmers’ choices of contract farming model, the empirical multinomial
logistic model (MNL) was used in the second step of analysis. The multinomial logistic model is
a multi-equation model that estimates k-1 model, where k is the number of levels of the outcome
variable. Each of the k-1 models is a binary logistic regression equation that compares each alterative
choice with the base or reference choice. The choice of contract farming model is important decision
for farmers where many transaction cost attributes are considerably the basis for precise decision.
In this study, the MNL model of farmers’ choices of contract farming is based on the random
utility theory [73]. The multinomial logistic is analogous to a binary logistic regression except that the
probability distribution is categorical placement. The independent variables can be either dichotomous
or continuous. Suppose that the Uij is the utility of certified coffee farmer ith derived from alternative
contract farming model j (where j = 1, 2, . . . , J), a certified coffee farmer utility function can be
represented as follows:
Uij = Vij + εij (1)
Sustainability 2019, 11, 3799 8 of 26
The perceived Uij is overall utility that can be expressed as sum of two terms: a systematic utility
Vij and a random residual εij. Indirect utility Vij represents mean of all coffee farmers having the same
choice context as farmer i. The εij captures the combined effects of the various factors that introduce
uncertainty in the model. If the certified coffee farmer ith selects the contract farming model j, the Uij
is the largest utility among other j utilities. The probability that farmer i selects alternative j can be
specified as:
Pij = P(Vij + εij > Vik + εik) for all other k , j (2)
If the error terms are identically and independently distributed, the probability that coffee farmer
i chooses contract farming model j can be explained by the multinomial logistic model (Green, 2000).
In this study, multinomial logistic (MNL) regression was used identify the determinants of coffee
farmers’ choice of contract farming model (j = 1: InforM referred to informal model; j = 2: InterM
referred to the intermediaries model; j = 3: NeM referred to nucleus estate model). Multinomial logistic
regression is often considered as standard method for estimating multi categorical dependent variables,
which does not assume normality, multicollinearity, or homoscedasticity across the choices [74,75].
Slightly different from discriminant function analysis that requires these assumptions are met, MNL is
a more flexible and robust method in the case of violations of these assumptions [75]. Application
of MNL in this study only has assumption of independence among the dependent variable choices
(Table 1). The probability of contract farming model choices among certified coffee farmers from the
alternatives is the function below:
P(Yi = j/Xi) = Pi j =
eXi.β j∑J
j=1 e
Xi.β j
, i = 1, 2, . . . , 183; j = 1, 2, 3 (3)
Table 1. Explanatory variables hypothesized in MNL model.
Variables Questionnaire/Variable Specification Mean SD Hypothesis
AGE Age of respondents (years) 44.60 10.03 +/−
GEN Binary variable =1 if respondent is male, 0 = female 0.67 0.47 +/−
EDU Continuous variable (number of years in school) 9.66 2.45 +
ETHN Binary variable = 1 if respondent is Kinh ethnicmajority, 0 = ethnic minorities 0.76 0.43 +/−
FARM Continuous variable (number of hectares allocatedfor coffee) 1.40 0.65 +/−
DURA
How long is the contract? 1 = long term,
0.62 0.49 +/−0 = short term (seasonal basis)
INPUT Does contract include inputs provision duringplanting? 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise 0.37 0.48 +
TECH Does contract include technical assistance duringplanting? 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise 0.63 0.48 +
SUPP
Do you have agreement on supply volume in
production contract with coffee-industrial firm?
1 = yes, 0 = otherwise
0.56 0.50 +
PRICE
Do you have agreement on price premium in
production contract with coffee-industrial firm?
1 = yes, 0 = otherwise
0.36 0.48 +
QUAL
Do you have agreement on coffee bean qualifications
in production contract with coffee-industrial firm?
1 = yes, 0 = otherwise
0.45 0.50 +
PAY Do you have payment within a week after delivery?1 = yes, 0 = otherwise 0.54 0.50 +/−
DELI Does coffee-industrial firm have schedule for yourdelivery? 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise 0.80 0.40 +
MOR
How often are the monitoring and supervision by
coffee-industrial firm during planting?
1 = frequently, 0 = not frequently
0.67 0.47 −
Note: SD denotes standard deviation.
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Where, Pij is the probability of ith farmer choice of contract farming model j. Hence, j = 1,
2, and 3 are the choices of informal coordination model (InforM), intermediaries model (InterM),
and nucleus estate model (NeM), respectively. Accordingly, Pi1, Pi2, and Pi3 are the probabilities
representing the selection of ith coffee farmer for the informal model (InforM), intermediaries model
(InterM), and nucleus estate model (NeM), respectively. Xi are independent variables (explanatory) that
include socioeconomic characteristics of certified coffee farmers and attributes in each contract farming
model. These are X1 = Age of household farmers (AGE), X2 = gender (GEN), X3 = education (EDU),
X4 = ethnic (ETHN), X5 = farm size (FARM), X6 = contract duration (DURA), X7 = input provision
(INPUT), X8 = technical assistance (TECH), X9 = supply volume agreement (SUPP), X10 = price
premium agreement (PRICE), X11 = agreement on coffee bean qualification (QUAL), X12 = Payment,
X13 = delivery schedule (DELI), and X14 = monitoring (MOR). Table 1 represents a detail of variables
used in MNL model. βj are parameters to be estimated by maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) with
InforM (informal model) as a base (reference) category (β1 = 0). The probability that a base (reference)
category was chosen are the following equation:
P(Yi = 1/Xi) = Pi1 =
1
1 + eXi.β2 + eXi.β3
(4)
The fact is that sum of Pij equals to 1, the separate probabilities that InterM (intermediary model)
and NeM (nucleus estate model) were chosen can be expressed as:
P(Yi = 2/Xi) = Pi2 =
eXi.β2
1 + eXi.β2 + eXi.β3
(5)
P(Yi = 3/Xi) = Pi3 =
eXi.β3
1 + eXi.β2 + eXi.β3
(6)
The parameter estimates measure the actual magnitude of change in the MNL for one unit change
in the explanatory variable while holding the other explanatory variables constant. The positive
estimated coefficient indicates an increase in probability that a coffee farmer will choose the alternative
contract farming model from base reference category (InforM) [73]. The negative estimated coefficient
refers to less likelihood that a coffee farmer will change to alternative options. The marginal effect Exp
(B) (see Table 4) measures the expected change in probability of a particular contract-farming model
being chosen with respect to a unit change in an explanatory variable from the mean. A common
measure of goodness of fit in choice models is the pseudo-R2 [76].
4. Results
4.1. Socioeconomic Charecteristics of Coffee Farmer
Descriptive statistics also shows that the age of certified coffee farmers ranges from 20 to 67,
and the average age is 44.6 years. The average education is 9.66 (years in school), which indicates
farmers’ capability to acquire and utilize skills and knowledge from trainings and transfer it into
efficient production (Table 1). A majority of the 139 respondents are Kinh ethnic and the rest are Ede,
Gia Rai, Tay, Thai, and other ethnic minorities (Table 2). Ethnic minority farms are less favorable for
coffee production and most of ethnic minority farmers in remote areas are now facing typical problem
of limited access to credit and technical assistance [46,68]. Among three contract-farming models,
the frequencies of ethnic minority farmers are 6.6%, 10.4%, and 7.1% in InforM, InterM, and NeM,
respectively. This accounts for 24% of total respondents in this study. Female farmers accounts for
one third of total respondents. In addition, the frequency of female farmers in informal coordination
model is relatively low at 2.2% (Table 2). It is worth noting that women are often a crucial resource in
agriculture and rural economy.
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Like most agricultural sectors in Vietnam, the unavoidable problem of the Dak Lak coffee sector is
that most coffee plantations are small-scale operations (<2 hectares), which hampers farmers to benefit
from economies of scale and apply synchronous production technologies. The average farm size is
1.4 hectares (Table 1). Descriptive statistics in Table 2 represent the frequencies of farm size in each
contract farming model. In the informal model (InforM), number of farmers with specified coffee land
for coordinating production smaller than 1 hectare, from 1–2 hectares, and more than 2 hectares account
for 34%, 61.7%, and 4.3% of the total InforM farmers respectively. The similar statistics respectively
are 13.3%, 75%, and 11.7% for the InterM and 13.2%, 76.3%, and 10.5% for the NeM. The frequency
analysis indicates that the numbers of farmers who devote larger coffee land to coordination program
are significantly higher in the intermediary model (InterM) and nucleus estate model (NeM) than
informal model (InforM).
Table 2. Socioeconomic characteristics of coffee farmers.
Variable InforM InterM NeM Total Chi-Square
Gender Female 4 (2.2) 30 (16.4) 27 (14.8) 61 (33.3) 20.696 a
Male 43 (23.5) 30 (16.4) 49 (26.8) 122 (66.7)
Ethnic Kinh 35 (19.1) 41 (22.4) 63 (34.4) 139 (76.0) 3.970 b
Others 12 (6.6) 19 (10.4) 13 (7.1) 44 (24.0)
Farm size <1 ha 16(34.0) 8 (13.3) 10 (13.2) 34 (18.6) 10.874 c
1–2 ha 29 (61.7) 45 (75.0) 58 (76.3) 132 (72.1)
>2 ha 2 (4.3) 7 (11.7) 8 (10.5) 17 (9.3)
Total 47 (100.0) 60 (100.0) 76 (100.0) 183 (100.0)
Note: a, b indicates zero cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.67 and
11.30. c indicates 1 cells (11.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.37. Figures
within the parenthesis are percentages computed for each column.
4.2. Coffee Contract Farming Model
Three contract-farming models were identified through which coordinating production and
distribution enhances production efficiency, technical synergies, standardization, and farm performance
(Figure 2). These contract farming models, not mutually exclusive, are the informal model, intermediary
model, and nucleus estate model. Typologies of contract are presented in Figure 3.
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The informal contract farming model (InforM), has been recently used by direct, informal,
and si ple production contracts with certified coffee farmers from Simexco Dak Lak, Anh Minh,
and Ar aj r c i s. These contracts are signed on a seasonal basis with limited support of capital
or materi l inputs. The advantage of this mod l ability to secure supply volume wit technical
advices, grading, and quality control. In fact, (exporters/processors) in this model only sign a
contract with ell-endowed farmers. For the deprived ones, they only provide informal arrangements
that specify the share of benefits and responsibilities of the two parties. However, these informal
arrangements contain a high risk of default that requires legal actions. The success of this model
depends on the availability of inputs markets and supporting institutions such as AgriBank, WASI,
and Peoples’ Committee in Dak Lak.
Intermediary model (InterM) involves Dak Man Company (coffee processor/exporter) in
subcontracting linkag s with certifi d coffee farmer to cooperatives, buying agents, or other small
companies. The use of cooperative as inter ediary is typica in this contra t farming model i Dak
Man. The advantage of this contract farming model is the large c ffee processors/exporters can avoid
the direct interaction through formal arrangement of cooperatives with multi small-scale coffee farmers.
Besides, cooperatives are responsible for required farming practices and inputs regimen in exchange
for marketing arrangement [8]. However, involved coffee processors/exporters can face potential risk
of losing control over production, standardization, coffee quality, and coffee prices paid to farmers by
cooperatives [25]. In addition, the buyers (Dak Man) must provide favorable policy terms, or even pay
a commission to cooperatives. Dak Man Company has been practicing the intermediary model for a
long time. In the beginning of 2016, Dak Man has already collaborated with 10 cooperatives, which
account for 668 certified farmer households farming an area of 1241 hectares with coffee production of
4862 tons.
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The nucleus estate contract farming model (NeM), referred to directed contract farming, has been
utilized by Thang Loi and Phuoc An Company (state-owned) who owns and controls large estate
plantation. They previously were state-owned farms during the 1990s and are now becoming joint-stock
companies with major businesses in coffee processing and export. These sponsors provide material
inputs and introduce synchronous technologies, management techniques, production certification
to coffee farmers (considered as satellite growers) [25]. Thang Loi and Phuoc An normally sign a
production contract with smallholder farmers on a long-term basis (sometime 5 to 6 year-crops).
The contract specifies how risks and rewards from coffee production are shared. The advantage of
this contract farming model is rigorous supervision over certified coffee production and distribution
as well as economies of scale. In addition, this model creates employment opportunities to local
communities. However, there have been incidents that certified coffee farmers have to pay an additional
commission to these companies. Agreements on supply quantity and price are other controversial
issues. The nucleus estate model recently accounts for 17%–18% of total coffee production in Dak Lak
with participation of Thang Loi, Phuoc An, and other state-owned companies [68].
4.3. Contract Attributes
Contract farming in written form or verbal agreements usually specifies responsibilities and
obligations of both parties, which can be made directly or indirectly with coffee farmers. In the
case of intermediary model (InterM), the buyers (coffee processors/exporters) signs the contract with
cooperatives or farmer associations who make their own arrangement with certified coffee farmers [25].
In this study, the specifications of coffee contract farming in Dak Lak include the duration of contract,
quality standard, farmers’ production quota, supply volume, required farming practices, delivery
arrangement, price premium, technical assistance, material input provision, and payment. In term
of contract length, formal arrangement between nucleus processors/exporters and coffee farmers
(NeM) are legally endorsed contracts that last in long-term basis (Table 3). In some particular cases of
NeM, contracts lasted for 5–6 years. In the informal model (InforM), the duration of contract is on
seasonal basis of which certified coffee farmers could resign from contract position as if they are not
willing to continue. However, farmers’ contract resignation should be notified (notice of cancellation).
In the InterM, the duration of contract depends on official cooperative membership of coffee farmers.
This is considerably a simple registration format of contract farming. Table 3 shows different contract
specifications in three contract farming models in Dak Lak.
Table 3. Contract attributes in different contract farming model.
Categories InforM InterM NeM Total Test
(n = 47) (n = 60) (n = 76) (N = 183) χ2 p-Value
Duration
- long term 0 (0.0) 38 (63.3) 76 (100.0) 69 (37.7) 123.680 0.000
- short term 47 (100.0) 22 (36.7) 0 (0.0) 114 (62.3) 123.680 0.000
Provision of inputs 8 (17.0) 21 (35.0) 38 (50.0) 67 (36.6) 13.709 0.001
Technical assistance 23 (48.9) 42 (70.0) 51 (67.1) 116 (63.4) 5.813 0.055
Agreement
- on supply volume 26 (55.3) 34 (56.7) 43 (56.6) 103 (56.3) 0.024 0.988
- on price premium 11 (23.4) 23 (38.3) 31 (40.8) 65 (35.5) 4.141 0.126
- on coffee quality 11 (23.4) 31 (51.7) 41 (53.9) 83 (45.4) 12.366 0.002
Payment
- within a week 29 (61.7) 35 (58.3) 35 (46.1) 99 (54.1) 3.509 0.173
- delayed 18 (38.3) 25 (41.7) 41 (53.9) 84 (45.9) 3.509 0.173
Delivery
- Scheduled 28 (59.6) 54 (90.0) 65 (85.5) 147 (80.3) 17.662 0.000
- Not scheduled 19 (40.4) 6 (10.0) 11 (14.5) 36 (19.7) 17.662 0.000
Monitoring
- Frequently 39 (83.0) 34 (56.7) 50 (65.8) 123 (67.2) 8.399 0.015
- Not frequently 8 (17.0) 26 (43.3) 26 (34.2) 60 (32.8) 8.399 0.015
Note: Figures within the parenthesis are percentages computed for each column.
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Provision of material inputs is limited in the InforM that refers to small proportion of surveyed
farmers having access to fertilizer and pesticide provided by Armajaro Company (17%). This attribute
was reported by a significant higher number of coffee farmers in intermediary and nucleus estate
model, which are 35% and 50%, respectively. Limited access to technical assistance is typical problem
that sometime hamper farmers efforts to boost productivity and make them unable to deliver the
volume and quality of the produce. However, the percentage of farmers who have access to technical
assistance in the InforM, InterM, and NeM are relatively high at 48.9%, 70%, and 67.1%, respectively.
In the InforM, as previously mentioned, Armajaro Company only signs formal contracts with endowed
farmers specifying required quality standards through percentage of ripe cherries. For those deprived
ones, informal arrangements merely describe the price premium in terms of whether farmers could
achieve good agricultural practices during planting. This ambiguous contract term later leads to
pricing disagreement when the delivery is carried out. Coffee price agreement in most cases is based
on local market prices and premium is calculated with regard to different production certification
types. Fields observation in this study reports the premium ranges from 200 to 2000 VND/kg coffee
bean (about 1 to 10 US cents). The number of farmers who reach agreement on supply volume, price
premium, and coffee bean qualification in the InforM accounts for 55.3%, 23.4%, and 23.4% respectively.
The agreements of these contract attributes between farmers and cooperatives were reported by 56.7%,
38.3%, and 51.7% of total surveyed farmers in the InterM. For the NeM, the statistics are 56.6%, 40.8%,
and 53.9% of coffee farmers whose supply volume, price premium, and coffee qualification terms in their
farming contracts were fulfilled. In different contract faming models, the buyers (processor/exporters)
often pre-arrange and organize delivery at the procurement points, location of designated local buying
agents, or at coffee farms. The respective frequency 59.6%, 90%, and 85.5% of total surveyed farmers in
the InforM, InterM, and NeM reported that procurement is usually scheduled before harvest. However,
late payment is common, as it occurred to 38.3%, 41.7%, and 53.9% of total surveyed farmers in these
contract-farming models. It is surprising that many coffee farmers (83%) in the InforM claimed that
the production was under frequent monitoring and supervision. The relatively lower percentages
56.7% and 65.8% of surveyed farmers in the InterM and NeM reported the frequent actions to monitor
and manage production by the cooperatives and nucleus sponsors (processors/exporters) despite
these contract-farming models are theoretically attributed to higher level of control over out-growers
production and efficient management. Finally, a legal remedy will exercise in the provincial courts
for a breach of contracts especially in case of NeM model that formal economic contracts have been
used between nucleus sponsors and out-grower farmers. For informal to semi-formal arrangements in
the InforM and InterM, non-compliance will lead to the exclusion of coffee farmers from production
coordination. In the case of production risks (disease, drought, precipitation, etc.) or market price
fluctuation, both parties come to a discussion of how such risks are evenly shared.
4.4. Estimation of MNL Model
Multinomial logistic (MNL) regression was used to assess certified coffee farmers choices in
three different contract-farming models. Using Akaike information criterion (AIC), the MNL model
fitted the empirical data (the lower the value of AIC the better model). The study used stepwise
method (backward elimination using Wald test) for removing and retaining the independent variables.
At the final step, there are seven independent variables enter the final models to evaluate the effects of
these variable on the preference of farmers toward different contract-farming model. These selected
variables obtained the probability of the likelihood-ratio statistic for variable entry smaller than
0.05 (see Appendix A Table A4), which include gender (GEN), farm size (FARM), provision of
inputs (INPUT), agreement on price premium (PRICE), technical assistance (TECH), delivery (DELI),
and monitoring (MOR). Excluded variables obtained the probability of the Wald test for variable
removal greater than 0.1 (see Appendix A Table A3), which are the age of coffee farmers (AGE),
ethnic (ETHN), education (EDU), duration of contract (DURA), agreement on supply volume (SUPP),
agreement on coffee bean qualification (QUAL), and payment (PAY).
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The results from multinomial logistic estimation of farmers’ preference for different
contract-farming models are in Table 4. Positive sign of estimated coefficient indicates an increase in
the probability of the alternative outcomes (here are InterM and NeM) relative to the changes in the
probability of the reference category (InforM) response [73]. On the contrary, negative sign of estimated
coefficient indicates a decrease in the probability of the alternative outcomes relative to the changes
in the probability of the reference category response. The selection of reference category depends on
the scientific aims of the study. Therefore, we selected informal farming model (InforM) as a base
category because it covers the smallest group of farmers in the research sample. The marginal effect
value Exp (B) indicates the magnitude of the changes in the probability of the alternative outcomes
relative to the changes in the probability of the reference category response as one-unit increases in the
explanatory variables.
Table 4. MNL parameters estimates of farmers’ preference for different contract farming models.
Contract Farming Model a B SE Wald Sig. Exp(B)
InterM
Intercept −0.610 0.899 0.460 0.498
GEN −2.860 0.682 17.594 0.000 * 17.462
FARM −1.470 0.470 9.800 0.002 * 4.351
INPUT 0.976 0.583 2.806 0.094 0.377
PRICE 1.154 0.559 4.257 0.039 * 0.315
TECH 1.327 0.534 6.190 0.013 * 0.265
DELI 1.506 0.626 5.792 0.016 * 0.222
MOR −2.094 0.600 12.169 0.000 * 8.114
NeM
Intercept 1.011 0.811 1.552 0.213
GEN −2.060 0.663 9.654 0.002 * 7.843
FARM −1.099 0.450 5.955 0.015 * 3.002
INPUT 1.724 0.531 10.550 0.001 * 0.178
PRICE 1.208 0.523 5.334 0.021 * 0.299
TECH 1.078 0.490 4.839 0.028 * 0.340
DELI 1.119 0.529 4.477 0.034 * 0.327
MOR −1.695 0.574 8.734 0.003 * 5.448
N = 183; LR Chi square (14) = 80.450; −2 Log likelihood = 314.715
Probability > Chi square = 0.000; Pseudo R2 (Nagelkerke) = 0.402
Note: a Base category is InforM. * Significant at p < 0.05.
The estimation results show that the variables of gender (GEN), farm size (FARM), and monitoring
(MOR) negatively and significantly influenced the preference of certified coffee farmers for the
intermediary model (InterM) and nucleus estate model (NeM) over the informal model (InforM)
(Table 4). The marginal effects of GEN and FARM indicate that as one unit increases in gender or
farm size expect to decrease the probability of farmer’s preference for the intermediary model over
the informal model by respective factors of 17.462 or 4.351, ceteris paribus. Accordingly, as one unit
increase in gender or farm size, the probability that farmers prefer to participate in the nucleus model
relative to the informal model expects to decrease by respective factors of 7.843 or 3.002, ceteris paribus.
Hence, we concluded that the preferences for the contract-farming model InterM and NeM over the
InforM were negatively relative to gender and farm size of certified coffee farmers. This means male
farmers who own larger farm size might not prefer to participate in the intermediary or nucleus
estate contract-farming model to the informal model. Given a one unit increase in the variable MOR,
the marginal effect of this contract attribute (monitoring) also implies that the probability of preferring
intermediary model and nucleus estate model over the informal model would decrease by 8.114 and
5.448 times, ceteris paribus. It did not seem that certified coffee farmers prefer to be under frequent
monitoring and supervision during planting.
The inputs provision (INPUT) variable positively and significantly affected the farmers’ choices of
nucleus estate model (NeM) over the informal model (InforM). Access to good material inputs not only
helps coffee farmers to increase quantity and quality of coffee supply but also enhances the livelihood
of coffee farmers. In the study areas, credit shortage often leads to farmers’ purchase of low-quality
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fertilizers and pesticide, which later results in inefficient coffee production. The marginal effect of
INPUT variable indicates that the likelihood of preferring a nucleus estate model to the informal model
would increase by 17.8%, ceteris paribus, given one-unit increase in this variable. Thus, the farmers’
preference for the nucleus estate model is positively relative to the ability of nucleus sponsors to
provide throughput via direct contract farming with their out-grower farmers.
Variables PRICE (agreement on price premium), TECH (technical assistance), and DELI (delivery)
positively and significantly affected the preference of certified coffee farmers for both intermediary
(InterM) and nucleus estate models (NeM) compared to the informal model (InforM). Holding other
variables constant, the marginal effects of PRICE, TECH, and DELI indicate that the likelihood of
preferring intermediary model to the informal model would increase by respective 31.5%, 26.5%,
and 22.2%, as one-unit increase in PRICE, TECH, and DELI variables. As well, the contract attributes
PRICE, TECH, and DELI of certified coffee farmers expect to increase the likelihood of preferring the
nucleus estate model to the informal model by respective 29.9%, 34.0%, and 32.7%, ceteris paribus.
We confirmed that farmers’ preferences of intermediary and nucleus estate model over the informal
model were positively relative to several contract attributes such as agreement on price premium,
technical assistance, and delivery. More generally, it would be expected that certified coffee farmers
are more likely to prefer intermediary and nucleus estate contract-farming model if the cooperatives
and the nucleus estate sponsors could provide favorable premium price, persistent technical advices,
and pre-arranged procurement.
4.5. Farm Performance under Different Contract Farming Models
In the coordinating production program, coffee farmers grow high-yield clonal Robusta coffee
lines such as TR5, TR6, TR7, TR8, TR11, TR12, TR13, TR14, TR15, and TR16 [77]. These clones provide
the productivity of 4-6 tons per hectare with good quality bean and percentage of R1 seed-size over
80 percent [68]. However, not many farmers could obtain the expected coffee yield due to water
scarcity, complicated pest and disease outbreaks, and inappropriate farming practices. Aged coffee
is also another concern associated with capital shortage problem of coffee farmers. Statistics from
Table 5 show that the highest percentage of coffee farmers who could obtain the productivity of
over 4 tons/hectare is in the informal model (31.9% of total number of respondents in the InforM).
Accordingly, there were 25% and only 2% coffee farmers in intermediary and nucleus estate model
achieved this productivity level, respectively. None of respondents in intermediary model reported
the productivity level lower than 2 tons/hectare. This productivity level was found at significant 13.2%
of coffee farmers in nucleus estate model. Many farmers in three contract farming model achieved
productivity level from 3–4 tons/hectare, which are 36.2%, 53.3%, and 32.9% in informal, intermediary,
and nucleus estate model respectively. The frequency of 35% of the total respondents in this study
reported the productivity level from 2–3 tons/hectare.
Table 5. Coffee yield under different contract farming models.
Categories InforM InterM NeM Total
Yield
<2 ton/ha 3 (6.4) 0 (0.0) 10 (13.2) 13 (7.1)
2–3 ton/ha 12 (25.5) 13 (21.7) 39 (51.3) 64 (35.0)
3–4 ton/ha 17 (36.2) 32 (53.3) 25 (32.9) 74 (40.4)
>4 ton/ha 15 (31.9) 15 (25.0) 2 (2.6) 32 (17.5)
Total 47 (100.0) 60 (100.0) 76 (100.0) 183 (100.0)
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig (2-Sided) Exact Sig. (2-Sided)
Person Chi-square 39.129 a 6 0.000 0.000
Likelihood Ratio 46.394 6 0.000 0.000
Fisher’s Exact Test 42.429 0.000
Number of Valid Cases 183
Note: a indicates 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.34. Figures
within the parenthesis are percentages computed for each column.
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The harvest of coffee in Dak Lak always lasts in approximately a month, starting at the end
of November or beginning of December. Once the coffee cherry was picked, it is either stored for
a few weeks or hulled right away to remove the outer skin and the inner parchment. Then the
preliminary dry processing must begin as quickly to prevent spoilage. After this, sun-dried coffee
beans are most likely being sold to buying agents (or collectors). However, under the coordinating
production program, harvested red cherries might go straight to wet processing by selling directly
to processors/exporters in accordance with signed contract terms. Contract farming normally does
not have strict terms about sale volume except the case of nucleus estate model. In this contract
farming model, coffee farmers have to turn in the designated quantity of harvested coffee to the
company (60%). In other cases, farmers could maximize their profits by choosing different buyers
or consign (deposit) their coffee beans to buying agents or processors/exporters and look forward to
better future price. Statistics in Table 6 show that most coffee farmers obtained the gross margin from
60 to 80 million VND/hectare/crop year (approximate $2660 to $3550 in 2017) in three contract farming
models. The highest number of 14 (23.3%) coffee farmer who achieved gross margin over 100 million
VND/hectare/crop year (approximate $4440) was found in the intermediary model. On the contrary,
the number of coffee farmers who could earn the gross margin less than 40 million VND/hectare/crop
year (approximate $1770) was significantly high in the case of nucleus estate model. The statistics are
30 farmers, which accounts for 39.5% of total respondent in NeM. The statistics of Tables 5 and 6 refer
to the fact that initial successes of coffee farmers in intermediary model stems from the important
role of cooperative in coordinating and managing coffee production between smallholder farmers
and coffee-industrial firms. More supporting evidence for this conclusion included the significantly
higher rates of return for coffee farmers under the InterM compared to other contract farming models
(see Appendix A Table A5 for more details). These were 1.765 (without the inclusion of family labor
cost) and 0.936 (with the inclusion of family labor cost) for the InterM farmers.
Table 6. Gross margin of coffee farmers under different contract farming models.
Categories InforM InterM NeM Total
Gross margin
<40 mil VND/ha 5 (10.6) 2 (3.3) 30 (39.5) 37 (20.2)
40–60 mil VND/ha 9 (19.1) 6 (10.0) 20 (26.3) 35 (19.1)
60–80 mil VND/ha 17 (36.2) 19 (31.7) 21 (27.6) 57 (31.1)
80–100 mil VND/ha 10 (21.3) 19 (31.7) 4 (5.3) 33 (18.0)
>100 mil VND/ha 6 (12.8) 14 (23.3) 1 (1.3) 21 (11.5)
Total 47 (100.0) 60 (100.0) 76 (100.0) 183 (100.0)
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig (2-Sided) Exact Sig. (2-Sided)
Person Chi-square 57.473 a 8 0.000 .b
Likelihood Ratio 63.868 8 0.000 .b
Fisher’s Exact Test .b .b
Number of Valid Cases 183
Note: a 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.39. b Cannot be computed.
Figures within the parenthesis are percentages computed for each column.
4.6. Perceived Benefits and Concerns from Contract Farming Participation
The overall objective of the coordinating production program is to reduce market uncertainty and
secure the possible return on the investment of both coffee farmers and coffee processors/exporters.
Coffee farmers engaged in this program through contract farming with these coffee processors/exporters
(private and state-owned) obtained the access to assured markets, improved their technical skill,
enhances production efficiency, eliminated production risk by sharing it with buyers, and attained
farming knowledge from trainings. However, there were many detected issues such as access
to credit, small-scale operation, water scarcity, public infrastructure, contract noncompliance,
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and over-dependency. Table 7 represents the benefits and issues regarding farmers’ participation in
the coffee production coordination program through different contract farming models.
Table 7. General benefits and main concerns in coordinating production and distribution.
Categories InforM InterM NeM Total Test
(n = 47) (n = 60) (n = 76) (N = 183) χ2 p-Value
Benefits
Better practices 6 (12.8) 22 (36.7) 34 (44.7) 62 (33.9) 13.560 0.001
Yield improvement 12 (25.5) 29 (48.3) 27 (35.5) 68 (37.2) 6.016 0.049
Risk mitigation 13 (27.7) 28 (46.7) 25 (32.9) 66 (36.1) 4.696 0.096
Knowledge attainment 9 (19.1) 28 (46.7) 37 (48.7) 74 (40.4) 11.956 0.003
Market access 16 (34.0) 17 (28.3) 7 (9.2) 40 (21.9) 12.676 0.002
Concerns
Limited access to credit 8 (17.0) 26 (43.3) 30 (39.5) 64 (35.0) 9.181 0.010
Small-scale production 35 (74.5) 36 (60.0) 48 (63.2) 119 (65.0) 2.626 0.269
Water unavailability 38 (80.9) 43 (71.7) 39 (51.3) 120 (65.6) 12.690 0.002
Poor public infrastructure 37 (78.7) 39 (65.0) 54 (71.1) 130 (71.0) 2.413 0.299
Noncompliance 14 (29.8) 27 (45.0) 28 (36.8) 69 (37.7) 2.638 0.267
Over-dependency 26 (55.3) 39 (65.0) 31 (40.8) 96 (52.5) 8.088 0.018
Note: Figures within the parenthesis are percentages computed for each column.
In term of perceived benefits, the total number of surveyed farmers who claimed that their
farming practices were better that later resulted in coffee yield improvement and production risks
mitigation are 33.9%, 37.2%, and 36.1% respectively. In this regard, the highest percentage of
surveyed farmers achieved better farming practices was in the nucleus estate model (44.7%), while
coffee yield improvement (48.3%) and lower risk level in production (46.7%) was reported by many
farmers in intermediary model. A majority of surveyed farmers also in nucleus estate model (48.7%)
acquired benefit of knowledge attainment through trainings provided by involved processors/exporters.
This explains the consecutive efforts of nucleus estate sponsors to reduce risks of supply ruptures
from unstable coffee production. However, it was surprising that many certified coffee farmers
claimed the benefit of improved market access in the informal contract farming model (34%). One of
many overarching challenges in Dak Lak coffee sector is smallholder farmers’ limited access to credit.
Combined with other typical problems of small-scale coffee farming, these constraints are often
auto-correlated. Among three different contract farming models, the largest numbers of surveyed
farmers in the intermediary model have been struggling with capital shortage but a lack of access to
credit (43.3%). In many cases, the certified coffee farmers had to borrow loan in form of material inputs
with the interest rates 11 to 12%/year.
A majority of surveyed farmers in the informal contract farming model (74.5%) reported small-scale
production constraints. These farmers in informal model also experienced the severe drought and
insufficient water supply during their plantation (80.9%). In addition, they argued that the local poor
infrastructures such as road condition and irrigation system hampered their efforts to achieve potential
level of coffee production efficiency (78.7%). The intensive practices of over-dependency on fertilizer,
pesticide, and irrigation water fostered several environmental problems such as water pollution and
soil degradation, which are now threatening the sustainability of the coffee sector. The largest number
of surveyed coffee farmers in intermediary model (65%) reported this problem. Accordingly, contract
non-compliance issues from both certified coffee farmers and buyers (processors/exporters) have been
ruining their shared-belief. This issue has most been found in the intermediary model (45%).
5. Discussion
The diversity of contract farming between farmers and agro-industrial firms is a result of the
technical requirements of production, associated factors of production, and transaction costs [39].
The study results revealed three different typologies of contract farming model, which are the informal
model, intermediary model, and nucleus estate model. These models differ in type of contractor (coffee
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processors/exporters), the intensity of vertical coordination, and characteristics of involved coffee
farmers [36–38]. However, the criteria to select coffee areas projected for coordinating production and
distribution in these contract farming models are similar, which includes agro-ecological suitability,
favorable infrastructure conditions, the prevalence of insecurity and crime, and the institutional
reliability [58]. The informal contract farming model (InforM) focuses on pre-harvest arrangements
between coffee processors/exporters and smallholder farmers, which specifies a set of conditions
governing the coffee supply volume [63]. Under this contract farming model, candidate coffee farmers
are certified (4C and RFA) and credit-available for coffee production. Informal coffee production
contracts are most often ad-hoc or semi-formal, and sometimes a verbal agreement that induces the
potential risk of default as pricing mechanism is flexible based on a local spot market price [37].
This leads to another problem of contract farming is side-selling where coffee farmers sell to other
buyers such as buying agent or local trader for better price or payment conditions [78,79]. This type of
contract cannot be enforced by legal authorities, which means that contract parties have economic and
social incentives to honor the agreements in all contingencies [80]. Intermediaries contract farming
model (InterM) binds the coffee farmers to follow particular farming practices to ensure quality
standards of coffee bean at predetermined price [37,63]. Certified coffee farmers participating in this
contract-farming model are cooperative members, which considers as simple registration format of
coffee production contract. The contract formulas based on market specification and production
management illustrate improved coffee yield as well as significantly higher farmer’s earning compared
to other contract-farming models in this study (see Table 6). By enforcing a fixed price agreement
for Fair trade-certified beans, the cooperative involvement is essential for augmenting win-win
outcomes for both Dak Man Company and certified coffee farmers in contract farming. From the
coffee farmers’ perspective, cooperative involvement not only helps to mitigate production risks
through training, extension, and technology acquisition but also rebalance the power relation between
processing/exporting firms and farmer growers. In this regard, farmers’ participation in contract
farming through cooperative arrangements can reduce information asymmetry and opportunism as
horizontal linkages is built in production [13,81]. A fixed price option was an advantage for cooperative
members against downside price risks in this case but can sometimes disfavor them if the ex post
spot price at the time of delivery is by far higher than the contractual price [30,61,78]. Nucleus estate
model (NeM) obliges the coffee processors/exporters to provide material inputs, technical assistances,
and sometimes credit for coffee production on land leased to coffee farmers [8,15,37,63,78]. Nucleus
estate model was expected to have advantages of fewer land acquisition, productivity improvement,
equal farmer’s welfare distribution, lower risk level of inconsistent coffee supply, and higher support
from government [15,78,82]. However, empirical results in this study indicate the other way around,
as coffee farmers in this contract farming model achieved a significantly lower coffee yield and earnings
(see Tables 5 and 6). In addition, the distribution of farmers’ earning from nucleus estate coffee
farming was asymmetric. Coffee farmers in this contract farming model grow UTZ certified coffee
and have to deliver the designated supply volume to state-owned sponsors (maximum 700 kg of
coffee bean per hectare—the case of Thang Loi Company). A problem of farmer’s overdependence on
production schedule, technical assistance, and marketing arrangement provided by nucleus estate
buyers impedes farmers’ autonomy to gain efficiency. Further, the monopoly power of the nucleus estate
processors/exporters in setting contract terms extracts the additional benefits of coffee farmers despite
the productivity growth [50,83]. From this perspective, the contract farming becomes exploitative
when severe power imbalances exist [13].
Coffee farmers’ preferences for contract farming are depending on several significant contract
attributes such as pricing mechanism, provision of material inputs, delivery schedule, technical
assistance, monitoring and supervision [8,59]. In addition, farmers’ specific characteristics such as
gender and farm size [8,58] are also significant contributors to coffee farmers’ preference toward
different types of contract farming. These factors are decisive for farmers’ decision in choosing whether
to sign a contract [53,54,58]. First, the price option is often a contract attribute that entails risks and
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rewards for certified coffee farmers under spot market volatility [49,84]. Estimation results from MNL
model indicate significant and positive impact of this contract attribute on coffee farmers’ preference of
intermediary and nucleus estate model to the informal model. The results are consistent with a favorable
pricing mechanism provided by the intermediary model (fixed price) and legal enforcement of a price
agreement in the nucleus estate model. In addition, statistics in Table 7 also reveals the higher number of
certified coffee farmers who reach price agreement in these contract-farming models than the informal.
As previously discussed, fixed pricing policies increase firms’ market risk, while transfer production
risk to coffee farmers [85]. Second, inputs-providing agreement positively and significantly influences
the choice of coffee farmers for nucleus estate model over the informal model, which indicates the
advantage of resource-providing specification of this model over the other two. However, the impact
of this contract attribute on coffee farmers’ preference for the intermediary model was insignificant.
Assuming the imperfect local input markets, ability to provide material inputs may give the involved
agro-industrial firms a monopsony power in the product market [8]. To avoid this problem, coffee
farmers could either improve access to key inputs through public agencies or NGOs (non-government
organization). In fact, this also endangers the contract farming relationship. Third, frequent technical
assistance motivates coffee farmers towards both the intermediary and nucleus estate model simply
because it helps to improve farm performance as well as positive spillover effects on farmers’ knowledge
and accumulative farming experience [52]. Decreasing in technical assistance may result in inefficient
coffee production, which leads to risk of default or contract cancelation. Certified coffee farmers
could improve access to technical assistance through public extension services that often operates
less effectively [49]. Fourth, scheduled delivery allows agro-industrial firms and farmers to minimize
internal transaction costs, losses during harvest, and most importantly quality uncertainty [37,85].
Besides, standardized coffee quality at contractual price premium improves farmers’ earning, which
secure the long-term relationship of both parties in contract farming. This is consistent with MNL
estimation that scheduled delivery positively and significantly influences the preference of certified
coffee farmers for contract farming models. The last attribute, monitoring and supervision, represents
the share of production risks between certified farmers and coffee processors/exporters. By close
monitoring and supervision of production, coffee processors/exporters eliminate risks of unstable
supply as well as quality uncertainty [86,87]. However, MNL estimation shows that monitoring and
supervision negatively affect farmers’ participation in contract farming. In addition, the relationship
between contract farming preference and socio-economic factors such as farm size and gender depends
on the correlation of these factors with the expected welfare gains [58]. MNL estimation results indicate
that certified coffee farmers with larger land acquisition tend to choose informal contract farming
model while female farmers prefer intermediary and nucleus estate model. Effect of gender on contract
farming participation has never been explored in the previous literature.
Several empirical studies have examined the benefits and problems regarding farmers’ participation
in vertical coordination through contract farming. Main issue revolves around the unequal distribution
of benefits [88,89]. In this study, the benefits stem from coordinating production and distribution
between certified coffee farmers and processors/exporters are in line with findings of [8,30,49,52,90,91].
On the contrary, the main issues regarding vertical coordination are common problems of smallholder
coffee farmers in Dak Lak, which was mentioned in previous studies of [41,47,79]. In addition, contract
breach is attributed to an asymmetry of information in the informal model [58]. The problem of farmers’
overdependence exhibits the monopoly power of agro-industrial firm over inputs management and
the monopsony power in the local coffee markets [8].
6. Conclusions
Agro-industrial firms can either rely on the spot market or completely manage farm production for
securing their supply of raw product. In this regard, contract farming is an institutional arrangement
that allows agro-industrial firms control over the production and distribution process with or without
owning the farms. On the other hand, smallholder farmers who participate in contract farming are
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able to access to credit, quality inputs, technical advancement, and high value markets. Farmers can
choose to contract for different reasons that most often are favorable set of contract attributes. Based
on multinomial logistic estimation, several contract attributes that influenced the choices of coffee
farmers for different contract farming models include a pricing option, delivery, technical assistance,
inputs provision, monitoring and supervision. Farmers’ preferences for the intermediary and nucleus
estate contract-farming models over the informal contract-farming model were negatively related to
monitoring and supervision by coffee-industrial firms, but were positively related to pricing option,
inputs provision, technical assistance, and delivery procedure. The result also indicated heterogeneity
among coffee farmers’ preferences towards different contract farming models as a verbal commitment
in the informal model was not preferable to a written commitment in the nucleus estate model or the
trust factor built on repeated transactions through cooperatives in the intermediary model. In order to
promote farmers’ participation in contract farming, coffee-industrial firms should facilitate agreement
and enforcement of the preceding contract attributes. This also could help minimizing ex ante and ex
post transaction costs occurred during the negotiation, execution, and termination of contract terms as
well as problems of side selling or contract breach. A cost-benefit analysis confirmed the important
role of cooperative in rural areas where economic transactions are embedded in social relationship.
From transaction cost economics (TCE) perspectives, contract farming is a response to uncertainty,
an incomplete market, and information asymmetry [50]. Rural coffee farmers most often encounter
input market uncertainty, product quality uncertainty, and output market uncertainty, which sometimes
discourage them from contract farming participation. In addition, the problem of incomplete market,
on one hand, gives the coffee-industrial firms monopolistic power in providing and managing inputs
for coffee farmers. On the other hand, the quality uncertainty and market imperfection lead to
firms’ monopsony in the output markets despite the fact that coffee beans are certified. Information
asymmetry creates an imbalance of power relations in transactions between coffee-industrial firms
and farmers, which sometimes facilitates contract breach (side selling) or coordination failures. In this
regard, the dominance of spot markets in Viet Nam [92] indirectly encourages opportunism behavior
of smallholder farmers. For all it is worth, contract farming as a response to these problems may fail to
reduce smallholder farmer exposure to risks.
Previous literature has often overlooked the effects of socioeconomic factors on farmers’ decisions
toward contract farming, while most focuses are on the institutional arrangement and transaction cost
attributes. In fact, this study provides empirical evidence that gender and farm size have significant
impacts on farmers’ preferences for different contract farming models. Limitations of the study could
include the potential problem of endogeneity from unobserved variables and the omitted region-specific
characteristics in MNL model, which supposedly causes bias estimates as contracts are not randomly
assigned across smallholders in different candidate locations. In addition, the inclusion of social and
welfare effects and the level of trust in preference-theoretic models could also be another direction
of further research. The study is not extrapolated to the entire coffee sector due to the results being
pertained from a small research sample and the data surveyed in one crop year.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Collinearity Diagnostics.
Variables
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients
t Ratio Sig.
Collinearity Statistics
B SE Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 1.081 0.250 4.319 0.000
AGE −0.004 0.004 −0.050 −0.985 0.326 0.696 1.437
GEN 0.009 0.080 0.005 0.110 0.912 0.808 1.238
EDU 0.006 0.015 0.019 0.401 0.689 0.820 1.219
ETHN 0.207 0.099 0.110 2.082 0.039 0.645 1.550
FARM 0.047 0.054 0.038 0.868 0.387 0.944 1.060
DURA 1.298 0.080 0.782 16.199 0.000 0.769 1.300
INPUT 0.208 0.076 0.125 2.724 0.007 0.857 1.167
TECH 0.092 0.077 0.055 1.192 0.235 0.843 1.186
SUPP 0.042 0.070 0.026 0.594 0.554 0.956 1.046
PRICE 0.107 0.076 0.064 1.414 0.159 0.880 1.136
QUAL −0.009 0.075 −0.006 −0.123 0.903 0.832 1.202
PAY 0.020 0.074 0.012 0.272 0.786 0.858 1.165
DELI −0.024 0.093 −0.012 −0.259 0.796 0.840 1.190
MOR −0.036 0.075 −0.021 −0.472 0.637 0.929 1.077
Note: VIF denotes variance inflation factor.
Table A2. Heteroscedasticity test.
LM Sig
Breusch-Pagan 11.936 0.611
Koenker 25.013 0.034
Note: Significant value is less than 0.05 referring to rejection of the null hypothesis. Null hypothesis: heteroscedasticity
not present (homoscedasticity). LM denotes Lagrange multiplier test statistics.
Table A3. Removed variables from MNL estimation.
Model Action Effect(s)
Model Fitting Criteria Effect Selection Tests
−2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square a df Sig.
0 Entered <all> 170.754
1 Removed DURA 302.569 0.004 2 0.998
2 Removed AGE 303.124 0.552 2 0.759
3 Removed EDU 303.889 0.761 2 0.684
4 Removed SUPP 305.066 1.158 2 0.561
5 Removed PAY 306.792 1.715 2 0.424
6 Removed ETHN 310.352 3.451 2 0.178
7 Removed QUAL 314.715 4.173 2 0.124
Note: a The chi-square for removal is based on the Wald test. Stepwise method is Backward Elimination.
Table A4. Likelihood ratio tests of selected variables in MNL estimation.
Effect
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests
−2 Log Likelihood of Reduced Model Chi-Square df Sig.
Intercept 314.715 a 0.000 0 0.000
FARM 326.083 11.368 2 0.003
DELI 321.725 7.010 2 0.030
PRICE 320.788 6.073 2 0.048
TECH 321.717 7.003 2 0.030
GEN 338.641 23.926 2 0.000
INPUT 328.210 13.495 2 0.001
MOR 329.632 14.918 2 0.001
Note: The chi-square statistic is the difference in −2 log-likelihoods between the final model and a reduced model.
The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters
of that effect are zero.
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Table A5. Cost-benefit analysis of coffee farmers under different contract farming models.
Variables
Contract Farming Model Comparisons of Column Means a
InforM InterM NeM InforM A InterM B NeM C
Coffee area 1.200 1.544 1.414 ns A ns
Productivity 3117.872 3516.917 3038.553 ns A C ns
Selling price 33.809 37.110 33.633 ns A C ns
Synthetic fertilizer 14,651.489 15,908.500 13,564.605 ns C ns
Organic fertilizer 6899.362 6617.647 6186.047 ns ns ns
Manure 6380.851 5370.000 5690.789 ns ns ns
Pesticide 1777.660 1872.500 1727.990 ns ns ns
Irrigation water 3690.000 4528.333 3646.184 ns ns ns
Hired labor 7963.830 9183.333 12229.605 ns ns A B
Depreciation 2543.976 2993.873 6035.776 ns ns A B
Other cost 1251.064 1210.500 1222.500 ns ns ns
Family labor 20,885.597 20,316.344 16,860.662 C C ns
Total cost 1 45,158.231 47,684.686 50,303.497 ns ns A
Total cost 2 66,043.828 68,001.031 67,164.159 ns ns ns
Total return 105,373.830 130,511.833 102,319.553 ns A C ns
Gross margin 1 60,215.599 82,827.147 52,016.056 ns A C ns
Gross margin 2 39,330.001 62,510.803 35,155.394 ns A C ns
Rate of return 1 1.346 1.765 1.035 C A C ns
Rate of return 2 0.591 0.936 0.514 ns A C ns
Note: Results are based on two-sided tests assuming equal variances with significance level 0.05. Labels A, B, and C
denote test results of each variable under categories InforM, InterM, and NeM. For each significant pair, the label of
the smaller category appears under the category with larger mean. a Tests are adjusted for all pairwise comparisons
within a row of each innermost sub-table using the Bonferroni correction. A superscript number 1 and 2 indicate
non-inclusion and inclusion of family labor cost in computations of total production cost, gross margin, and rate of
return. Family labor cost was measured by the average local market price for hired labor. A superscript letter “ns”
denotes “not significant”. Measurement unit for production cost was thousand VNDs per hectare, for productivity
was kilogram per hectare, and for selling price was thousand VNDs per kilogram.
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